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Abstract 
It has been recently argued, contrary to the received 
eighteenth-century view, that disgust is compatible with 
aesthetic pleasure. According to such arguments, what allows 
this compatibility is the interest that art appreciators 
sometimes bestow on the cognitive content of disgust. On this 
view, the most interesting aspect of this cognitive content is 
identified in meanings connected with human mortality. The 
aim of this paper is to show that these arguments are 
unsuccessful. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
isgust is generally considered one of a limited 
number of basic emotions, i.e. emotions that are 
standardly considered to be universally hard-wired in 
humans.i ii It should then come as no surprise that 
disgusting art (i.e. art that warrants an appreciator’s 
response of disgust) has been around for nearly as long as 
art itself. Aspects of art that elicit disgust can be found in 
almost all ages, art forms, genres, and in many different 
artists.iii On the other hand, it is perhaps more striking that 
disgusting art has generally been neglected by aesthetics 
and philosophical thinking about the arts. Many other 
emotions, including variants of most basic emotions, have 
instead been discussed a lot more often (e.g. fear, anger, 
sadness, pity, not to talk about more pleasant emotions). 
 
One period in which aesthetics addressed the role of 
disgust in art with some systematicity was the eighteenth 
century, especially in German-speaking circles. The issue 
was initially discussed in the writings of Johann Adolf 
Schlegel and of his brother Johann Elias, and 
subsequently by such venerable authors as Moses 
Mendelssohn, Gotthold E. Lessing and Immanuel Kant.iv 
Although these authors showed some differences of 
opinion, they all expressed the negative view according to 
which disgust, unique amongst unpleasant emotions, was 
incompatible with aesthetic value—at least in the great 
majority of cases.v vi 
 
Either under the influence of this eighteenth-century view, 
or, to use Arthur Danto’s phrase, of a general 
‘unmentionability’ of disgust,vii philosophical aesthetics in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries generally 
(continued to) neglect disgust.viii By contrast, sections of 
contemporary art history and criticism, as well as of 
D 
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cultural theory, proved more systematically interested in 
disgusting art.ix In fact, disgust appeared, and still appears 
to many, to be a conspicuous presence in the 
contemporary artworld. Such was for instance the opinion 
of art historian Jean Clair, former director of the Musée 
Picasso in Paris. As he pithily summarized it, ‘[T]he times 
of disgust have replaced the age of taste’.x These 
circumstances have put extra pressure on the defenders of 
the traditional, eighteenth-century view sketched above. 
 
It is time for a new cycle of serious philosophical 
engagement with disgusting art to start. Much has of 
course changed since the eighteenth century. In 
particular, we now have a significant amount of carefully 
collected evidence about the workings of disgust 
(courtesy of the experimental work done in the last three 
decades in the cognitive sciences). Moreover, philo-
sophical mainstream views about art and value and, to 
some extent, about common artistic tastes have 
meanwhile become more open-minded. In particular, it 
has become difficult to endorse a view of the value of art 
that would have been common in the eighteenth century, 
viz. the view that makes artistic value coincide with 
aesthetic pleasure. For instance, it is easy to see that the 
value of disgusting art may in many cases reside in 
rewards that are to an extent extrinsic to the aesthetic-
emotional experience narrowly construed. Of this kind 
are for example the cognitive rewards that for Noël 
Carroll are a crucial part of the artistic value that is 
distinctive of horror fictions.xi Nonetheless, Carolyn 
Korsmeyer, in reviving the topic of disgusting art in 
contemporary aesthetics, has argued against both 
cognitive accounts à la Carroll and the received 
eighteenth-century view.xii My central aim in this paper is 
to offer reasons to doubt the plausibility of Korsmeyer’s 
account of the aesthetic value of disgusting art. 
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2. KORSMEYER 
 
Arguing against accounts of disgusting art that locate its 
value in the cognitive rewards that it sometimes affords, 
Korsmeyer recently advocated a more holistic, integrated 
account that locates the value of disgusting art in the 
aesthetic-emotional experience itself. By contrast, arguing 
against the received eighteenth-century view of disgust as a 
poor ingredient for great art, she optimistically reaffirmed 
the potential of disgusting art to achieve the highest peaks 
of aesthetic value. Nonetheless, Korsmeyer’s account of 
disgusting art’s aesthetic value is close to the kind of 
general account of aesthetic value that many in the 
eighteenth century endorsed. In her own words, her aim is 
to 
 
emphasize the capacity of disgust to impart 
an intuitive, felt grasp of the significance of 
its object. As Paul Guyer puts it in a 
summary of the contribution of Alexander 
Baumgarten […] “The particular feature of 
sensory perception that is exploited for the 
unique pleasure of aesthetic experience … is 
its richness, the possibility of conveying a 
lot of information through a single pregnant 
image…”xiii 
 
The key claim in Korsmeyer’s view is that disgust can be 
part of aesthetic appreciation, its unpleasantness not-
withstanding. This is so insofar as disgust offers cognitive 
riches that command an appreciator’s interest and 
attention (or ‘absorption’, to use Korsmeyer’s term). This 
is not, she clarifies, simply to say that cognitive rewards 
compensate for the emotion’s unpleasantness. On her 
view, the appreciator can ‘savour’ disgust itself in virtue 
of the ideas that the emotion embodies. She argues that 
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‘emotions have meaning—have semantic content—that is 
delivered by the bodily changes that define them’.xiv In a 
jargon that is more familiar to contemporary philosophical 
discussions of the emotions, the semantic content that an 
emotion can embody can be called the ‘cognitive’ content, 
or component, of the emotion. 
 
In this respect, what for Korsmeyer is most distinctive of 
disgust, as well as especially apt to aesthetic appreciation, 
are meanings connected with human mortality. Disgust, she 
says, ‘means decay, putrefaction, disintegration: 
death’.xv xvi But, she adds, fear, too, is semantically 
associated with death, for the fearsome also represents 
threats to our life. Nonetheless, the disgusting and the 
fearsome are associated with mortality in different ways. 
Unlike fearsome objects, 
 
objects that disgust pose long-term threats 
that are all the worse for being absolutely 
inexorable. Disgust is more of a response to 
the transition between life and death…xvii 
 
On Korsmeyer’s view, then, fear and disgust are both 
associated with mortality, but disgust’s association with 
mortality is more specifically an association with the 
transition from life to death.xviii It is worth noting at this 
point that Korsmeyer’s argument assumes that there is a 
one-way entailment between a semantic connection with 
the transition from life to death and a semantic connection 
with mortality. For her, fear and disgust both concern 
mortality but the latter’s association with the transition 
from life to death is what differentiates disgust from fear. 
The semantic entailment from life—death transition to 
mortality looks plausible enough: whatever transitions from 
life to death is necessarily mortal (even if, as Christians 
think of Jesus, this transition might be reversible). 
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However, the conceptual connection also runs the other 
way: whatever is mortal is such only insofar as it can, and 
at some point does, transition from life to death. Perhaps, 
however, Korsmeyer’s notion of a semantic connection is 
meant to be more psychological than conceptual. In this 
sense, it would seem as though the transition from life to 
death more easily (e.g. more often, or for more people) 
brings to mind, or makes one think of mortality,xix than 
mortality brings to mind transition from life to death. 
Nonetheless, this is an eminently empirical issue, which 
seems far from obviously settled. 
 
For my purposes, however, settling this issue is not 
necessary, as I will argue that disgust is in no relevant way 
a response to either mortality or the transition from life to 
death. There are two ways in which Korsmeyer motivates 
the semantic connection between disgust and the transition 
from life to death. One way was already suggested in the 
passage quoted earlier: ‘objects that disgust pose long-term 
threats that are all the worse for being absolutely 
inexorable’. In the light of the current best empirical 
understanding of disgust, it is in fact very plausible that 
disgust evolved to protect us from such long-term threats as 
diseases.xx Nonetheless, not all disgust elicitors are threats 
to our well-being: worms are disgusting to many but are not 
especially dangerous in terms of human diseases; the same 
is true of cheese and other dairy products, which to some 
are disgusting.xxi 
 
The second motivation for disgust’s connection with life—
death transition that Korsmeyer offers is that, immediately 
after death, we rot and become individually indistinct like 
many disgusting things. 
 
Disgust recognizes the communion of death 
with the process of disintegration, along 
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with the subsequent devolution to life-forms 
where discrete individual identity is 
insignificant, giving way to swarms, nests, 
hives, infestations. […] Reflection on the 
emotion leads to the nasty realization that 
the time will come when our own integrity 
will suffer the same indignities, that the 
exalted human will become one with the 
worm.xxii 
 
Besides the human corpse, several other common disgust 
elicitors are putrefying substances and thus bear some 
resemblance to humans after their death: animal corpses, of 
course, but also faeces, and organic rubbish more generally. 
Moreover, other common disgust elicitors can be 
characterized as individually indistinct in Korsmeyer’s 
sense: e.g. worms and insects. Here again, however, 
counter-examples can be easily found, as many common 
disgust elicitors are neither rotting nor individually 
indistinct: amputated bodies, for instance, but also bodily 
secreta like spit and mucus. 
 
3. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS 
 
Some may not be convinced by my appeal to these counter-
examples. Beyond threats to well-being and individual 
indistinctness, these critics would mention additional ways 
to connect particular disgust elicitors with the idea of 
mortality or of transition between life and death. One kind 
of option in this respect is offered by views that insist on 
disgust’s alleged role in coping with our fear of death. Such 
views have their most influential instance in Rozin and 
collaborators’ view of the disgusting (or at least of a proper 
sub-set of it) as a reminder of our animalness:xxiii 
‘[a]nything that reminds us that we are animals elicits 
disgust’.xxiv On this view, one of the functions of disgust is 
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to keep us humans at a psychologically healthy distance 
from reminders of our own animal nature, and hence of our 
own mortality. Without disgust, on such a view, we would 
have been a lot less successful in our evolutionary fight for 
survival and reproduction, because paralyzed by the 
prospect of dying. 
 
This view, initially quite influential (partly as a result of the 
pioneering and landmark status of Rozin and collaborators’ 
overall work on disgust), has recently lost the favour of 
much of the scientific community (whilst many other 
aspects of their overall views and results on disgust are still 
very much mainstream).xxv It is certainly true that a lot of 
common disgust elicitors bear some association with 
animalness, since most if not all of them are organic 
substances. However, the view that disgust is a defence 
against the idea of animalness is hardly compatible with the 
widespread evidence suggesting that we do not have any 
general aversion to animals. For one thing, as Royzman and 
Sabini point out, we share very many anatomical and 
behavioural features with non-human animals and a lot of 
these are not typically disgusting: legs, arms, eyes, walking, 
running, breathing, scratching, stretching etc. In fact, we 
have very favourable attitudes towards several features of 
many animals: cats and the way they jump, horses and their 
gait etc.xxvi 
 
It is also highly debatable that non-human animals have for 
us a special connection with mortality. We have ample 
occasion to witness mortality in our own species. If there is 
anything that we often associate with animals generally, 
that is perhaps a lack of intelligence, or elegance, or of 
civility (even though in the right circumstances even these 
associations are reversed: and so foxes are cunning, giraffes 
move graciously etc.). 
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Although from a decidedly more philosophical perspective, 
Colin McGinn has also argued for a connection between 
disgust and human mortality.xxvii
xxviii
 After putting forward 
counter-examples to many alternative accounts of the 
distinctive cognitive components of disgust, McGinn 
advances his own ‘death-in-life theory’. On this theory, 
what disgusts does so insofar as it reminds one, or makes 
one think of, ‘death as presented in the form of living 
tissue’.  For the purposes of the theory, however, not 
any life or death will do, but only ‘the notions of life and 
death as they apply to a conscious being’.xxix  
 
The three cognitive components here identified by McGinn, 
i.e. death, life and consciousness, are for him each 
necessary, but only jointly sufficient, for disgustingness. 
(For example, death is not sufficient, because, he suggests, 
bones are not disgusting.xxx) On such a very common 
disgust elicitor as the (human) corpse, McGinn’s theory 
fares quite well: corpses are disgusting because they make 
us think of death; but they also make us think of life (for 
corpses bear some signs of life, e.g. in the form of bacterial 
activity). Moreover, they make us think of life and death, 
as these apply to conscious, human beings. (Here I 
understand McGinn’s theory as requiring only a general 
connection with life and death as they apply to a conscious 
being. The formulation appealing to ‘death as presented in 
the form of living tissue’ is certainly more suggestive, but it 
is also too metaphorical to be handled with ease. Corpses 
are not literally death.) The case of corpses also fits well 
with Korsmeyer’s idea of a transition from life to death 
(even if McGinn’s account is not obviously concerned with 
such a transition). 
 
However, McGinn’s theory has much more trouble with 
other disgust elicitors. To be sure, the formulation of his 
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theory that I am considering has quite a wide scope. This is 
it: 
 
(MGD) Something is disgusting if and only 
if it reminds us of life and death as they 
apply to a conscious being. 
 
Still, the theory suffers from serious difficulties, including 
the existence of counter-examples on both the sufficiency 
and the necessity sides of MGD. Of the disgustingness of 
faeces, for instance, McGinn says that ‘life and death exist 
co-presently in’ them.
xxxii
xxxiii
xxxi There is death in them because 
they are the end-product of digestion: ‘the digestive process 
takes living things as input and delivers dead things as 
output [...] the rectum is a grave’.  But there is also life 
in them, insofar as digestion, of which they are a part, is a 
living process and ‘the very foundation of all animal 
life’.  Moreover, faeces are organic matter (life) but 
seem inanimate (death). This characterization of faeces 
may be thought-provoking as a cultural analysis of some 
people’s perceptions of bodily excreta. But it puts under 
stress the plausibility of McGinn’s theory. His reasons for 
faeces’ being at the same time dead and alive are 
essentially metaphorical or figurative—and, in fact, involve 
several different metaphors and figures of speech. Faeces 
are dead qua end-product of digestion (end-as-death), or 
they are dead as they do not move (death-as-immobility). 
By contrast, they are alive because they take part in life 
(metonymy), but also because they are organic matter 
(possibly the only literal statement or, in another sense, 
metonymical). 
 
The appeal to metaphors is in principle acceptable for a 
theory that relies on associations of ideas, or to what-
makes-one-think-of.xxxiv Nonetheless, McGinn needs to 
come up with such a variety of distinct ways to figuratively 
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connect disgust elicitors (often very widely shared ones) 
with MGD, that the plausibility of MGD as an account of 
disgustingness starts to become seriously questionable.  
 
Take spit and mucus. McGinn talks about the latter in a 
footnote and attributes disgustingness to it as something 
that reminds us of life, insofar as it used to be part of a 
living, conscious organism; insofar as it is no longer part of 
such an organism, however, mucus also calls to mind death 
(death-as-cessation or death-as-exit). In this, McGinn says, 
mucus resembles faecal matter, which ‘dies […] when 
released from the anus’.xxxv A similar reasoning can be 
applied to spit. 
 
In the same vein, amputated bodies would likely be 
disgusting, for McGinn, as they remind one of the missing, 
amputated part of the living, conscious organism. But, why 
are some deformed bodies disgusting? Think of the limbs 
of an elephantiasic or of The Elephant Man’s face in the 
1980 eponymous Lynch movie: no part of the body in these 
cases is or appears severed. If anything, the relevant 
disgustingness seems to arise from excess, rather than from 
subtraction. Here, too, of course, McGinn might be able to 
suggest an ingenious connection. As is the case with 
resemblance, metaphors and figures of speech can pretty 
much connect anything with anything else. The issue 
however remains the plausibility of such a connection as a 
reason for disgust. 
 
Finally, and even less plausibly, McGinn attributes the 
disgustingness of some insects (those that do not have 
frequent contact with faeces or with other disgust elicitors) 
to their ‘lying between life and death’.xxxvi They are alive, 
obviously, but they are ‘also curiously machinelike—with 
[their] hard exterior, [their] coolness to the touch, and 
[their] mechanical behavior’; they are ‘close to tiny 
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robots’.xxxvii
xxxviii
 Here McGinn’s suggestion is that machines 
and robots remind us of death because they are lifeless 
(another metonymy). And yet, robots are not disgusting 
because, McGinn adds, ‘they are not organic’.  Fair 
enough, but then why should the figures of speech stop at 
this? Why, for instance, does robots’ animation not remind 
us of life? 
 
Against William Ian Miller’s suggestion that what really 
disgusts is the life soup, or ‘the capacity for life’, McGinn 
himself correctly suggests the following:xxxix 
 
what makes certain life processes disgusting 
and others not? We need an independent 
criterion of the disgusting to answer that 
question, since the concept of life itself is 
too broad to capture the range of objects that 
disgust us. Talk of soup […] is all well and 
good, but these are metaphors, in need of 
literal interpretation.xl 
 
Well said—and McGinn’s own account is vulnerable to this 
very same criticism.xli 
 
4. THE FORMAL OBJECT OF DISGUST 
 
One may still object that the existence of the counter-
examples advanced in the previous two sections should not 
be seen as a problem for Korsmeyer’s account of the 
aesthetic value of disgust. In fact, this objection would go, 
Korsmeyer might choose to retreat from a general 
understanding of disgust as a response to the transition 
from life to death, to a less ambitious understanding on 
which only some disgusting things hold the requisite 
semantic association with human life and mortality. 
However, this is not a move of which Korsmeyer can avail 
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herself without radically changing her account of the value 
of disgusting art. The semantic association to which 
Korsmeyer appeals is in fact meant to be part of the 
cognitive content of the emotion of disgust. As I noted 
earlier, the aesthetic value of disgust for her does not lie in 
a merely extrinsic connection (e.g. a co-occurrence) 
between certain ideas associated with an object, and a 
certain feeling or emotion directed towards the same object. 
A merely extrinsic connection would in fact make the 
aesthetic value of disgusting art best accounted for by a 
cognitivist theory. Instead, the meanings to which 
Korsmeyer appeals cannot but be part of disgust’s cognitive 
content. What this means can be clarified in terms of the 
notion of the formal object of an emotion. 
 
On a rough-and-ready characterization, the formal object of 
an emotion is the property that an emotion ascribes to its 
intentional object (or to the object that the emotion is 
about).
xliii
xlii The formal object of fear, for instance, is the 
property of being immediately threatening (or of being 
immediately threatening to the prospective emoter or to 
those that she cares about). Part of what it means to be 
afraid of something, in other words, is to understand that 
something as an immediate threat. Similarly, the formal 
object of anger is thwarting desires or expectations or 
being a demeaning offense (of/to the emoter’s or those that 
she cares about), and the formal object of sadness is being a 
loss (for the emoter etc.).  
 
More generally, emotions have a cognitive content in the 
sense that they ascribe a formal object to their intentional 
object. It is only in virtue of such an ascription that 
Korsmeyer’s view of emotions’ embodiment of meanings 
can be understood. The meaning that fear embodies, for 
instance, is necessarily something to do with the threat that 
the feared thing poses. If this is correct, then Korsmeyer is 
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committed to saying that the formal object of disgust is, or 
has something important to do with, the transition between 
life and death. Moreover, since embodied meanings for 
Korsmeyer work as sources of aesthetic appreciation, the 
formal object of disgust has to figure, with some non-null 
degree of awareness, in the experience of an emoter/ 
appreciator. Although emotional experience will not be 
conscious all of the time, embodiment of meanings without 
any (even just potential) awareness on the part of the 
appreciator is not very useful from the point of view of 
aesthetic appreciation. 
 
As a consequence, Korsmeyer’s view is in tension with the 
fact, noted earlier, that there are things deemed disgusting 
that do not have properties importantly connected with 
human mortality (i.e. worms, cheese, spit etc.). Not only do 
such things lack the relevant properties, but they are known 
(by emoters) to lack those properties. Someone who is 
disgusted by such things does not thereby ascribe those 
properties to them. In other words, the formal object of 
disgust—at least insofar as an emoter can be aware of it—
should not be characterized in terms of anything like 
human mortality or the transition from life to death. 
 
One may object that this is an unjustified conclusion. Why 
is the case of disgust in fact not like the fear that some of us 
have towards perfectly harmless things or situations, e.g. 
the proverbial small dog? On one way to cash out the 
scenario, one knows that the small dog is not harmful, but 
one is afraid anyway. Firstly, however, scenarios like this 
are sufficiently rare in the population for them to be outlier 
cases, whereas the disgust counter-examples cited earlier 
are not nearly as rare. Secondly, and relatedly, many feel 
entitled to consider one’s fear of the small dog as 
irrational, and perhaps even deserving of mockery. The 
case of disgust is again different, as I doubt many would 
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dismiss someone’s disgust for worms or spit as irrational, 
or mock them for it. 
 
Another possible objection concerns my earlier 
characterizing as very plausible the view that disgust 
evolved to defend us from such long-term threats as 
diseases. If the distinctive evolutionary benefit of disgust 
centres on long-term threats, then it would seem that 
disgust’s formal object would do, too. In fear, after all, the 
two things are intimately connected: the formal object (i.e. 
being threatening) and the likely evolutionary benefit of 
fear (i.e. alerting to and protecting from threats). 
 
However, disgust does not achieve its evolutionary benefit 
in the same way that fear (and several other emotions) do. 
Fear achieves it by incorporating a concern with threats in 
its formal object in the way described. Generally speaking, 
I am afraid of something if and only if I (more or less 
consciously) find it threatening. Disgust achieves a similar 
goal, but does so differently. 
 
On the best scientific view of disgust currently available, 
each of us has a hard-wired set of things or features of 
things that we are prepared to find disgusting.xliv As a 
consequence of such preparedness, each of us will find it 
easier to acquire disgust towards items in their 
preparedness set than towards items outside of it. Which 
things one will be disposed to find disgusting depends on 
the process of disgust acquisition. Disgust acquisition 
mostly, typically, happens in an early ontogenetic window, 
and is heavily influenced by the input provided to the baby 
by parents or tutors (e.g. during toilet training). Afterwards, 
one’s list of disgust elicitors can lose or acquire members. 
The important point, however, is that, in both early and 
later life, the main disgust acquisition routes are evaluative 
conditioning (i.e. stimuli become disgusting by co-
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occurring often with other, already disgusting, or otherwise 
undesirable ones) and the law of contamination (i.e. things 
become disgusting through contact with other things that 
are independently deemed disgusting).xlv 
 
Among other things, this means that disgust is, as some 
have called it, a peculiarly ‘plastic’ emotion.
xlvii
xlviii
xlvi Each of us 
will not necessarily have all of the members of their hard-
wired preparedness set on their list of disgust elicitors, nor 
will each item on this list necessarily be from their hard-
wired preparedness set.  As a consequence of the 
peculiarities of the disgust mechanism, disgust elicitors 
come to be of many different kinds. In fact, some go so far 
as to say that it is ‘highly implausible […] that disgust 
elicitors all share some property above and beyond 
triggering disgust’.  Moreover, typically, the (distal) 
reasons behind our disgust reactions are either buried in our 
hard-wired preparedness set, or in our past history of 
experiences (evaluative conditioning), or concern a history 
of contact with other disgust elicitors (law of 
contamination).xlix Consequently, there is no other way to 
characterize the formal object of disgust, at least insofar as 
this is relevant to aesthetic appreciation, except as in terms 
of the very property of disgustingness, or of the properties 
that are conceptually entailed by it: e.g. a disgust elicitor’s 
unappealingness-to-contact, or its perceived power to 
‘contaminate’ or to make other things disgusting through 
contact—or even perhaps the inchoate idea of its 
representing an unspecified threat.l Such properties are not 
significantly connected with ideas of mortality or of 
transition from life to death. 
 
It is perhaps worth emphasizing here that I am not 
suggesting that disgust has no formal object. What I am 
suggesting is simply that, if disgust has a formal object, this 
cannot be formulated in a way that is both (in principle) 
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accessible to consciousness (and hence directly valuable to 
aesthetic appreciation) and non-circular (i.e. in a way that 
does not refer back to disgustingness itself). In fact, 
contemporary attempts to formulate the formal object of 
disgust follow two general routes. Either the formulation is 
circular (i.e. is in terms of disgustingnessli or of 
conceptually related propertieslii), or it appeals to pre-
conscious determining factors (e.g. is in terms of disgust’s 
evolutionary designliii). It is an interesting question, and 
one that divides scholars, that of whether a characterization 
of the formal object of an emotion in terms of that emotion 
is viciously circular.liv The answer to this question crucially 
depends on what theoretical work one wants the notion of 
formal object to do and on how one defines it. I do not want 
to settle these issues here. The impossibility to formulate a 
consciously accessible and non-circular formal object for 
disgust is sufficient for my purposes. If there is no such 
thing, then Korsmeyer’s appeal to ideas of mortality cannot 
be useful in an account of the aesthetic value of disgust. 
 
5. MORAL DISGUST AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The upshot of this paper then is that Korsmeyer is wrong to 
claim that there is an internal connection between disgust 
and the transition from life to death, or mortality generally, 
that is relevant to aesthetic appreciation. This leaves open 
the problem of accounting for the aesthetic value of disgust 
(including the issue of whether or not there is such a thing). 
What I have done is, however, to formulate some 
restrictions and caveats on the kinds of meanings that can 
form the cognitive component of disgust. These consid-
erations should inform future research. 
 
Also a matter for future research is the role in art of what is 
often called ‘moral disgust’, including the plausibility of a 
mortality account for morally disgusting art. My focus in 
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this paper has been on disgust as the reaction that is 
frequently elicited by such bodily or material things as 
faeces and corpses. According to the vast majority of 
contemporary cognitive science researchers, this is the core 
or original disgust reaction.lv However, several other 
phenomena—some but not all of which emotional or 
affective—are also often called ‘disgust’: from the extreme 
lack of sexual interest in a potential partner to the profound 
dislike for certain fashion trends or styles of music. These 
phenomena are related to (bodily) disgust in various ways, 
depending on the theories and on the specific cases in 
question; and the relevant kinds of relationships vary from 
a merely metaphorical connection to identity. 
 
According to a plausible view, bodily disgust is the 
evolutionarily primitive affective mechanism that is then 
adapted (possibly starting from our evolutionary past) to 
serve functions other than pathogen avoidance in domains 
such as the sexual (mate selection and avoidance) and the 
moral (social interaction management). Given the diversity 
in functions, some, but not necessarily all, components of 
the bodily disgust response are also part of the responses 
that are typical of disgust-related mechanisms in other 
domains.lvi 
 
Moral disgust in particular is an interesting case, because it 
shares many features of the bodily disgust response, and yet 
its elicitors are often very different kinds of things from the 
common elicitors of bodily disgust. Although sometimes 
moral disgust may be elicited by such bodily activities as 
gay sex (arguably eliciting in those who feel it a mixture of 
bodily and moral disgust), frequent moral disgust elicitors 
are such things as deception, Ponzi-scheme scams or 
terrorist attacks. Moreover, moral disgust elicitors are often 
actions or behaviours, rather than objects as is more 
commonly the case with bodily disgust. On the other hand, 
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there is reliable evidence that moral disgust is sometimes 
accompanied by many of the behavioural and physiological 
aspects of the disgust response.
lviii
lvii Moral disgust is also 
sometimes accompanied by behavioural and 
phenomenological responses appropriate to (sometimes 
even physical) contamination.  
 
Nevertheless, bodily disgust is not the whole story in moral 
disgust. Judgements of morality are important in moral 
disgust, but not nearly as much (if at all) in bodily 
disgust—and so are anger, indignation, sometimes 
contempt etc.lix This is so notwithstanding the suggestion 
that is sometimes expressed by the characterization of 
disgust as a “moralizing emotion” (i.e. the suggestion that 
judging something as disgusting is sometimes sufficient for 
judging that thing as morally negative). This suggestion 
does not in fact necessarily concern all (or even most) of 
what is disgusting. Moreover, the evidence in support of 
said suggestion is still far from conclusive.lx The 
consequence of the complex nature of moral disgust is that 
accounting for the aesthetic value of morally disgusting art 
will require a lot of future work. Such work will however 
be able to build on the considerations concerning bodily 
disgust raised in this paper.lxi 
 
 
NOTES
 
i From now on, unless otherwise specified (see especially §5), I use 
‘disgust’ (and its cognates) to refer to bodily disgust (i.e. the emotion 
that most of us have towards faeces, urine, animal carcasses etc.). 
Outside of the scope of the present investigation are elicitors of moral, 
social, and other disgusts, and the emotional responses that they elicit. 
This is in keeping with the scope of Korsmeyer’s views. Cf. especially 
Korsmeyer, Savoring Disgust (Oxford University Press, 2011), 5. 
ii From Darwin onwards, the vast majority of contemporary emotion 
theorists consider disgust as one of the basic emotions. The few authors 
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who disagree with the consensus do so not because they disagree with 
the universality and hard-wiredness of the disgust mechanism, but 
rather because they consider disgust as not cognitively sophisticated 
enough to be classified as an emotion; cf. Jaak Panksepp, Affective 
Neuroscience (Oxford University Press, 1998) and Edward B. 
Royzman and John Sabini, ‘Something it takes to be an emotion’, 
Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 31 (2001), 29—60 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5914.00145). 
iii From Hesiod, Sophocles, Dante, Caravaggio and Rembrandt, through 
to Hermann Nitsch and Damien Hirst, all sorts of artists have produced 
disgusting art. Even Paleolithic art appears to offer examples of 
disgusting art, or at least examples of art that represents the disgusting 
(e.g. blood from wounds or animals defecating), as R. Dale Guthrie 
suggests in his The Nature of Paleolithic Art (The University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), 270 ff. 
iv For a rich and well-informed historical account of these authors’ 
remarks, see Winfried Menninghaus, Disgust (State University of New 
York Press, 2003), 25 ff. Across the Channel, other eighteenth-century 
authors also discussed the issue to some extent, especially Edmund 
Burke, in A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. 
by J.T. Boulton (Routledge, 1757/1958), 85—86. Burke’s views are 
more nuanced than those advocated by his German-speaking 
contemporaries, with the exception of Lessing’s (see below). 
v Most of them in fact advocated the even stronger view that what is 
disgusting in nature could not be represented in the fine arts without 
this being an aesthetic flaw of the work. Most of them held the view 
that what is disgusting in nature cannot but be disgusting in art as well. 
Cf. Filippo Contesi, ‘Korsmeyer on Fiction and Disgust’, British 
Journal of Aesthetics 55 (2015), 109—16 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayu014). 
vi In the Laocoön, ed. by Edward A. McCormick (Bobbs-Merrill, 
1766/1962), Lessing advocated a somewhat more nuanced view than 
his contemporaries, according to which there are some cases, especially 
in literary works, in which disgust is compatible with aesthetic value 
(e.g. 132). Lessing also questioned the uniqueness of disgust with 
respect to its problematic role in art: he extended the peculiar place of 
disgust amongst unpleasant ‘sensations’ to ‘ugliness of forms’ or to 
‘the perception of physical ugliness’ (Lessing, Laocoön, 126 and 130). 
vii ‘There is, significantly, very little notice given to the disgusting 
in the history of aesthetics from Kant to Jean Clair. [...] Aesthetics itself 
has been regarded as part of what Santayana designates as the 
Genteel Tradition, in which the disgusting, because unmentionable, was 
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unmentioned, and art was taken as logically incapable of giving 
offense: if it gave offense, it was after all not art.’ (Arthur Danto, 
‘Marcel Duchamp and the End of Taste: A defense of contemporary 
art’, Tout-Fait: The Marcel Duchamp Studies Online Journal 1(3) 
(2000) 
<http://www.toutfait.com/issues/issue_3/News/Danto/danto.html>.) 
viii The most notable exception is Karl Rosenkranz, who devotes section 
B. III. b) of the fourth part of his 1853 monograph Aesthetics of the 
Ugly to ‘The Nauseating’. Not dissimilarly from Lessing, Rosenkranz 
considers the disgusting as a type of ugliness and admits a few 
instances of good artistic use of the disgusting. In Rosenkranz’s case, 
the disgusting, and the ugly more generally, are artistically valuable 
insofar as they serve the vicarious role of highlighting the value of the 
beautiful. See Rosenkranz, Estetica del Brutto (Aesthetica, 2004), 
203—209. 
ix For a couple of recent examples, see e.g. Michel Chaouli, ‘Van 
Gogh’s Ear’, in Frances Connelly (ed.), Modern Art and the Grotesque 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47—62, and the Kristeva-
influenced Michelle Meagher, ‘Jenny Saville and a Feminist Aesthetics 
of Disgust’, Hypatia 18 (2003), 23—41 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2003.tb01411.x). 
x Clair’s phrase is even pithier in the original French, where ‘disgust’ 
and ‘taste’ share the same root: ‘Les temps du dégoût a remplacé l’âge 
du goût’ (De Immundo (Galilée, 2004), as cit. in Tedeschini, ‘On the 
Good Life of Disgust’, Lebenswelt 3, 200 (2013)). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.13130/2240-9599/3484  
xi See Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror, or Paradoxes of the Heart 
(Routledge, 1990), esp. chapter 4. Although Carroll nominally 
discusses disgust as part of the response of ‘art-horror’, his discussion 
is marred by his embracing a Mary-Douglas-inspired view of disgust as 
categorial violation. In so doing, his analysis ends up concerning a 
different phenomenon or set of phenomena from bodily disgust, one 
that is far from extensionally identical with the latter. For a critique of 
views of disgust as categorial violation, see e.g. Paul Rozin and April 
Fallon, ‘A perspective on disgust’, Psychological Review 94 (1987), 
23—41, 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.94.1.23  
xii See Carolyn Korsmeyer, Savoring Disgust. It is however worth 
noting that Carole Talon-Hugon’s Goût et dégoût (Éditions Jacqueline 
Chambon, 2003) anticipates many of the themes later developed in 
Korsmeyer’s book. 
xiii Korsmeyer, Savoring Disgust, 8. The quotation is from Guyer, 
Values of Beauty (Cambridge University Press, 2005); author’s 
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emphasis. Here I take Korsmeyer to be extending Guyer’s use of the 
word ‘image’ to include emotions or feelings. 
xiv Korsmeyer, Savoring Disgust, 28. Here Korsmeyer approvingly 
describes an aspect of the theory advanced in Jesse Prinz, Gut 
Reactions (Oxford University Press, 2004). She endorses this aspect of 
Prinz’s theory more explicitly at 30: ‘The manner in which Prinz 
articulates appraisals, in which it is the bodily feeling itself that 
possesses semantic content, indicates an especially useful way to 
understand aesthetic apprehensions involving disgust.’ Korsmeyer’s 
general view of emotion is by her own admission syncretistic in its 
attempt to capture what is good in each of the major competing theories 
of emotion. It would therefore be misleading to extend her endorsement 
of Prinz’s theory beyond the few remarks quoted. 
xv Korsmeyer, Savoring Disgust, 122. 
xvi See also: ‘In any event, the occasions for aesthetic disgust that 
interest me most are those for which I want to claim a strong degree of 
insight and truth about human frailty and mortality, for which disgust in 
its material, visceral version plays a far-reaching and subtle role’ 
(Korsmeyer, Savoring Disgust, 5; emphasis mine); and, ‘Insofar as 
disgust plays a role in such insights, it places us in intimate contact 
with mortality—for we do not simply think about the transience of 
existence, we register its inevitability in our very viscera’ (Korsmeyer, 
Savoring Disgust, 100; emphasis mine). 
xvii Korsmeyer, Savoring Disgust, 122; emphasis mine. 
xviii Korsmeyer’s view is explicitly inspired by some remarks made by 
Aurel Kolnai, ‘Disgust’, in his On Disgust, ed. by Barry Smith and 
Carolyn Korsmeyer (Open Court, 1929—1998/2004). For a 
contemporary Kolnai-inspired view of disgust, see Colin McGinn, The 
Meaning of Disgust (Oxford University Press, 2011); see infra for more 
on this view. 
xix The latter is the expression used by Colin McGinn, in an 
understanding of the semantic connection along the more psychological 
lines in question (see e.g. The Meaning of Disgust, 82, and below in 
this paper). 
xx See Valerie Curtis and A. Biran, ‘Dirt, disgust, and disease’, 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 44 (2001), 17—21 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pbm.2001.0001). 
xxi Others might simply dislike cheese, i.e. find it distasteful. But 
distaste is not the same attitude as disgust. As Rozin and Fallon, ‘A 
perspective on disgust’ point out, there are distasteful things that do not 
disgust (I encourage my reader to take their pick: for me it is chicory 
and green beans, within the edible, and clean sand outside of it). Also, a 
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lot of what disgusts does not do so because it tastes bad: in fact, most of 
us do not even know what many of the most common disgust elicitors 
taste like (think e.g. of insects or faeces). One crucial output difference 
between distaste and disgust is the capacity of elicitors of the latter to 
pass on disgustingness to (or ‘contaminate’) almost anything that gets 
in contact with them. 
xxii Korsmeyer, Savoring Disgust, 123. 
xxiii Such views share key claims, and are sometimes even identified, 
with so-called ‘Terror Management Theories’. These latter theories are 
inspired by anthropologist Ernest Becker’s The Denial of Death (Simon 
& Schuster, 1973). 
xxiv Rozin, Haidt and McCauley, ‘Disgust’, in Michael Lewis, J. 
Haviland-Jones and L. Feldman Barrett (eds), Handbook of Emotions 
(Guildford Press, 2008), 757—776, 761. 
xxv For a review of criticisms advanced to Rozin and colleagues’ 
animal-reminder view of disgust, see Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, and 
DeScioli, ‘Disgust: Evolved function and structure’, Psychological 
Review 120 (2013), 65—84, 2—3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0030778  
xxvi See Royzman and Sabini, ‘Something it takes’, 44—47. 
xxvii See McGinn, The Meaning of Disgust. Like Korsmeyer’s, 
McGinn’s view is also explicitly inspired by Kolnai’s 
phenomenological study of disgust. 
xxviii McGinn, The Meaning of Disgust, 89—90 (author’s emphasis). 
xxix McGinn, The Meaning of Disgust, 94 (author’s emphasis). 
xxx Korsmeyer makes the same point about bones (Savoring Disgust, 
123). 
xxxi McGinn, The Meaning of Disgust, 102. 
xxxii McGinn, The Meaning of Disgust, 101. 
xxxiii McGinn, The Meaning of Disgust, 102. 
xxxiv This appeal to metaphors is instead much more problematic if one 
considers McGinn’s wider view of disgustingness as an objective 
property. According to McGinn, if Martians were to be disgusted by 
crystals but not by faeces, they would be wrong (see The Meaning of 
Disgust, 61). An account of disgustingness that relies so heavily on 
figurative speech and thought is hardly compatible with a view of 
disgustingness as an objective, rather than a culturally constructed, 
property. 
xxxv McGinn, The Meaning of Disgust, 102. 
xxxvi McGinn, The Meaning of Disgust , 114 (author’s emphasis). 
xxxvii Ibid. 
xxxviii Ibid. 
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xxxix Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust (Harvard University Press, 1998), 
40. 
xl McGinn, The Meaning of Disgust, 81. 
xli Similar points to those made in this section were also made in 
Strohminger, ‘The Meaning of Disgust: A refutation’, Emotion Review 
6 (2014), 214—216 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1754073914523072), in 
a somewhat more aphoristic fashion. 
xlii Cf. Ronald de Sousa, ‘Emotion’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/emotion/>.  
xliii It is perhaps worth pointing out here that one of the theoretical 
functions of a formal object is to account for the unity of an emotion 
and for its difference from other emotions. This rules out the option of 
having more than one formal object for disgust, which might have 
helped Korsmeyer’s case.  
xliv See Rozin and Fallon, ‘A perspective on disgust’, 38—9. 
xlv See Curtis, de Barra and Aunger, ‘Disgust as an adaptive system for 
disease avoidance behaviour’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences 366 (2011), 389—401 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0117). Curtis et al. also identify as 
a third route the Garcia effect (i.e. the kind of aversion that one may for 
instance develop to, say, sardines, after eating too many of them and 
having an indigestion). However, I prefer not to consider Garcia-effect 
aversions as instances of disgust. Crucially, the former lack the 
capacity that the latter have to transmit disgustingness according to the 
law of contamination. The Garcia effect was actually identified for the 
first time in rats, which are taken by most (albeit crucially not by 
Curtis) only to have proto-components of the human disgust response; 
cf. Garcia, Kimeldorf and Koelling, ‘Conditioned aversion to saccharin 
resulting from exposure to gamma radiation’, Science 122 (1955), 
157—158 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1752118), and Daniel R. Kelly, 
Yuck! (MIT Press, 2011). 
xlvi Cf. Christopher Knapp, ‘De-moralizing Disgustingness’, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003), 253—278, 255. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00261.x  
xlvii Arguably, in fact, such plasticity is evolutionarily useful in itself as 
it allows for a modulation of the protection afforded by the disgust 
response according to, for instance, particular environmental 
specificities. It is also, according to some, what allows disgust to 
extend its operative scope to, e.g., the sexual and moral domains. See 
Kelly, Yuck!, and Tybur et al., ‘Disgust’. 
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xlviii Daniel Kelly, Yuck! (MIT Press, 2011), 27. A similar view is 
advanced by Royzman and Sabini, ‘Something it takes’ (although they 
rather talk of the absence of a single common ‘abstract property’ or 
‘abstract proposition’). 
xlix Our proximate reasons for disgust can be instead much more 
accessible to our consciousness. For instance, being disgusted by 
mucus is typically dependent on believing or imagining that what we 
are disgusted by actually is mucus (cf. Rozin and Fallon, ‘A perspective 
on disgust’ and Contesi, ‘Korsmeyer on Fiction and Disgust’). 
However, proximate reasons of this kind are not relevant to my 
purposes here, as they are neither part of an emotion’s formal object, 
nor can they be said on their own to be part of the meanings that an 
emotion embodies. Fear of a tiger approaching, for instance, may 
embody ideas that concern the way in which the tiger moves its steps 
on the ground, but only insofar as these steps are threatening. The 
tiger’s stepping towards me in the way that it does is not necessarily (or 
in all possible worlds) connected with fear, but only insofar as fear is 
the emotion that responds to immediate threats. 
l With respect to the latter, the inchoateness is a consequence of the way 
disgust works, as I have described it in this paper. Other emotions 
involve ideas of threat, for instance fear, but in a richer and more 
distinct sense. As Kolnai illuminatingly says with respect to the 
distinction between disgust and fear: ‘disgust has often been 
apprehended as a mere variant of fear—a conception whereby we 
should somehow also experience fear of what is disgusting, a fear 
which is however characterized by a peculiar additional quality. Many 
disgusting objects are, as is well-known, harmful or dangerous, yet 
without displaying directly that open gesture of threat which belongs to 
what is fearful in the narrowest sense, such as those forces of nature, 
living beings, and events by which human beings can be seized and 
crushed. […] But this conception is not tenable, for there is a well-
known mode of fear or anxiety that pertains to concealed and nebulous 
dangers without having anything to do with disgust at all. In order to 
produce disgust, elements are required which are totally different from 
those which produce insidious threats, and the latter may be entirely 
absent in the presence of disgusting objects’ (‘Disgust’, 46—7; 
emphases mine). 
li de Sousa, ‘Emotion’: ‘I am disgusted because it is disgusting’ 
(emphasis mine). 
lii Richard Lazarus: ‘[t]aking in or being too close to an indigestible 
object or idea (metaphorically speaking)’ (Emotion and Adaptation, 
Oxford University Press, 1991, as cit. in Prinz, Gut Reactions, 16). 
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Lazarus does not talk of ‘formal object’ but uses the (in many ways 
equivalent) notion of a core relational theme; see also Prinz, Gut 
Reactions, 80; Jonathan Haidt, threatening contamination (as reported 
in Royzman and Sabini, ‘Something it takes’, 48); Alexandra Plakias, 
being ‘contaminated and contaminating’ (‘The Good and the Gross’, 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2013), 261—278, 262). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9334-y  
liii Tybur et al., ‘Disgust’, esp. 66—67. 
liv Cf. for instance de Sousa, ‘Emotion’, who only finds ‘an appearance 
of tautology’ in adopting such a characterization; on the other side, cf. 
Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, (Routledge, 1963), who, in 
his very introduction of the notion of an emotion’s formal object to the 
contemporary debate, specifies that: ‘A formal object should not be 
confused with an internal accusative, such as occurs in the expressions 
“to dream a dream”, “to play a game”’ (190). Cf. also Julien Deonna 
and Fabrice Teroni, The Emotions (Routledge, 2012), 41—42 for a 
view of the latter kind. 
lv Some views that are more common in psychoanalytic, literary and 
anthropological circles, however, take (or at least can be construed as 
taking) socio-moral disgust as the basis for disgust generally. See 
Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust, and Susan B. Miller, Disgust: The 
gatekeeper emotion (Routledge, 2004). 
lvi See Tybur et al., ‘Disgust’, and Tybur, Lieberman and Griskevicius, 
‘Microbes, mating, and morality: Individual differences in three 
functional domains of disgust’, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 97 (2009), 103—122 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0015474). 
lvii For a review of such evidence, see Rozin, Haidt and Fincher, ‘From 
oral to moral’, Science 323 (2009), 1179—1180 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1170492). See also Danovitch and 
Bloom, ‘Children’s extension of disgust to physical and moral events’, 
Emotion 9 (2009), 107—112 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014113). 
lviii See Haidt, Rozin, McCauley and Imada, ‘Body, Psyche, and 
Culture: The relationship between disgust and morality’, Psychology 
and Developing Societies 9 (1997), 107—131 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097133369700900105), and, more recently, 
Plakias, ‘The Good and the Gross’. 
lix See e.g. Gutierrez, Giner-Sorolla and Vasiljevic, ‘Just an anger 
synonym? Moral context influences predictors of disgust word use’, 
Cognition and Emotion 26 (2012), 53—64 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2011.567773). 
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